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L’humanité et la vie de la langue : des « Two Cultures » à Montaigne « de l’insti-
tution des enfans »
Résumé
Cet article propose une analyse du débat entre C. P. Snow et F. R. Leavis à propos des 
« Two Cultures » – ou la guerre des lettres et des sciences – qui a eu lieu pendant les 
années cinquante et soixante; il suggère que derrière les propos de Leavis se cache 
une conceptualisation distincte, voire unique, de l’ « humain ». Pour Leavis, l’humain 
n’est ni un genre ni une catégorie stable ; il s’agit plutôt d’une activité littéraire, d’une 
forme de lecture, et des effets phénoménologiques d’une telle activité. Mais cette 
manière de lire dite « humaine » n’est pas décrite clairement dans le texte de Leavis ; 
la dernière partie de cet article propose donc une lecture de De l’Institution des enfans 
de Montaigne, le chapitre où Montaigne – souvent vu comme l’inventeur de la subjec-
tivité contemporaine, (post-)moderne, ou « (post-)humaine » – traite explicitement 
des thèmes pédagogiques discutés par Snow et Leavis, et qui offre des indices concrets 
d’une lecture qui répond sensiblement à la capacité des mots à rendre humain, à faire 
vivre.
Mots-clés : C. P. Snow, F. R. Leavis, les « Two Cultures », post-Humanisme, Michel de 
Montaigne 
Summary
This article analyses the often aggressive discussion between C. P. Snow and F. R. Leavis 
about the « Two Cultures » – what might otherwise be termed the « war of literature 
and science » – which took place in the 1950s and 1960s. It suggests that behind Leavis’s 
strident attack lurks a novel, even unique, understanding of the « human ». For Leavis, 
the « human » is neither a genre, nor a stable category, but a literary activity; a mode 
of reading and its phenomenological effects. But the precise qualities of this « human » 
response to language are often unclear from Leavis’s implications; the final section of 
this article thus analyses Montaigne’s De l’Institution des enfans, the chapter where 
Montaigne – often seen as the inventor or anticipator of contemporary, post-modern or 
post-human subjectivity – explicitly deals with the kind of pedagogical themes discussed 
by Snow and Leavis, and which offers concrete signs of the kind of reading which might 
respond sensibly to words which live and make live.
Key words : C. P. Snow, F. R. Leavis, the « Two Cultures », post-Humanism, Michel de 
Montaigne 
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Introduction
This three-part essay rereads the « Snow-Leavis controversy » – the origin of the 
term « two cultures » which still marks discussions of the arts’ relation with the 
sciences – in terms of contemporary debates exploring the word « human » and its 
variants (humanism, humanity, humanitarianism), and asks if the present era might 
best be termed « post-human ». It argues first F. R. Leavis’s virulent attack on C. P. 
Snow’s « The Two Cultures » is not so much a straightforward defence of the arts as a 
fundamentally different concept of the « human ». While Leavis never quite explicitly 
formulates this, he implies throughout that « humanity » is not a stable entity but a 
timebound activity. Humans are more, and differently, « human » from one moment to 
another. And they are most intensely human in the activity of reading literary language. 
Indeed, the literary value of texts, we could derive from Leavis’s argument, can be 
quantified and evaluated in precisely these « humanising » effects. Leavis’s implied 
(and perhaps unwitting) reconception of the ontology of the « human » as dynamically 
verbal, not statically substantive, is seen in the second part as a contribution to discus-
sions concerning the « post-human », recently summarized in Stefan Herbrechter’s 
valuable The Posthuman: A Critical Analysis. It argues the « humanism » disavowed 
by the most radical « post-humanists » has little to do in its bloated universalism with 
Leavis’s nimbler, verbal understanding of the concept. Leavis’s intuitions about the 
« human » as something dynamic, changeable, linguistic – but no less existent for all 
that – seem to resist the most radically nihilistic modes of « post-humanist » thought 
(which loosely incorporate and overlap with post-modernism and post-structuralism). 
When called upon to actually define and articulate what he means by the human, 
however, Leavis’s argumentation is sometimes fuzzy. The third part of the essay thus 
seeks to address this problem – and thus contribute to debates about whether Montaigne 
presciently anticipated key strands of contemporary thought – by reading De l’Insti-
tution des enfans: Montaigne’s most forthright engagement with the kinds of pedago-
gical issues disputed so bitterly by Snow and Leavis, and a chapter centrally concerned 
with the humanizing potential of reading literature. Critics like Stephen Toulmin 
have noted texts from Montaigne’s period make thinkable certain fusions of science 
and literary discourse, simply because they precede the kinds of divisions Snow talks 
about.1 But Montaigne’s text may also address certain blind spots in Leavis’s arguments 
about just how language may « humanise »; the open-ended form of his Essais seems 
self-consciously to perform language, demonstrating its own content as an engaged, 
verbal self-portrait.2 Montaigne’s text thus exemplifies what Leavis only describes: a 
real-time written testimony of the effects on a « human » of reading: of living language. 
In this, Montaigne demonstrates more than Leavis the idea of the human as literary 
performance, an idea Leavis is forced to discover under pressure from Snow.
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Snow’s « Two Cultures » and Leavis’s verbal humanism
The « Snow-Leavis controversy » refers to F. R. Leavis’s scathing 1962 Richmond 
Lecture « Two Cultures? The significance of C. P. Snow », in response to C. P. Snow’s 
1959 Rede lecture « The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution », which has since 
gone through over thirty reprints and is still well-known today.3 The chief arguments 
of Snow’s lecture are well known. First, there are « two cultures » in contemporary 
British intellectual life: one Snow attributes to « literary intellectuals » (e.g. Snow, 
1998:4); the other to « physical scientists » (e.g. Snow, 1998:4). Second, these « two 
cultures » are polarized, incomprehensible to each other, « [t]here seems […] to be no 
place where the cultures meet » (Snow, 1998:16). Third, the « [literary] intellectuals » 
– called by Snow « natural Luddites » – ignore if not actively resist the « scientific 
revolution currently helping the material betterment of the human race » (Snow, 
1998:22). Fourth, this imbalance in the education system – especially at the stage of 
University scholarship examinations and after – will have dire effects for Great Britain’s 
future geopolitical and economic position: a topic of special concern in Snow’s Cold War 
reality. « I believe », Snow claims, « the Russians have judged the situation sensibly. 
They have a deeper insight into the scientific revolution than we have, or than the 
Americans have » (Snow, 1998:36).
For Leavis, however, « the argument of Snow’s Rede lecture is […] incomparably 
more loose and inconsequent than any I myself […] should permit in a group discussion 
I was conducting, let alone a pupil’s essay » (Leavis, 2013:60).4 This withering attack on 
Snow’s argumentative structure is motivated: the way Snow yokes the « two cultures » 
together – making them commensurable so as better to contrast them – silently reduces 
the arts to science’s negative corollary, depriving the arts of any independent existence, 
silently compelling any potential defence of the arts to rely on Snow’s reductive terms.5 
This is precisely what Leavis refuses to do. If, for example, Snow complains (on no other 
basis than personal anecdote) that « literary intellectuals » cannot explain to him the 
2nd Law of Thermodynamics: « something which is about the scientific equivalent of 
Have you read a work of Shakespeare’s? » (Snow, 1998:15), then Leavis retorts: « There 
is no scientific equivalent of that question; equations between orders so disparate are 
meaningless » (Leavis, 2013:73). Correspondingly, Snow’s caricature of the « literary 
intellectual » is condemned by one of the twentieth century’s most important literary 
intellectuals as « the enemy of art and life » (Leavis, 2013:61). 
Leavis’s attack on the bases of Snow’s pseudo-opposition between the arts and the 
sciences, carried out so as to re-establish the terms’ independent values, is paralleled 
by that on Snow’s pseudo-opposition between the « tragic » « individual condition » 
(« each of us is alone », « each of us dies alone », Snow, 1998:6) – catered for by the 
« Luddite » « literary intellectual » – and the « social condition », marked by « social 
hope », as advanced by the scientist. For Leavis this opposition quite simply makes no 
sense. 
17
Synergies Royaume-Uni et Irlande n° 7 - 2014 p. 15-30
What is the « social condition » that has nothing to do with the « individual 
condition »? What is the « social hope » that transcends, cancels or makes indifferent 
the inescapable tragic condition of each individual? Where, if not in individuals, is what 
is hoped for – a non-tragic condition, one supposes – to be located? (Leavis, 2013:65) 
Exposing the underlying (and often problematic) implications of Snow’s parallel dicho-
tomies – art vs. science, individual vs. social – Leavis warns against instrumentalising the 
individual from school onwards as mere contributor to Snow’s « scientific revolution ».6 
The implied focus on « productivity (the supremely important thing) », the « standard 
of living », « wages », « salaries and what you can buy with them » is for Leavis 
« not enough – disastrously not enough » (Leavis, 2013:71). This is because it « cannot 
be regarded by a fully human mind as a matter for happy contemplation » (Leavis, 
2013:72, my emphasis). For Leavis, then, Snow’s argument – relying on stereotypes, 
caricatures and false dichotomies ultimately to reduce arts to entertainment, individual 
to contributor – is nothing less than dehumanization. Indeed, Snow’s arguments’ very 
success seems worryingly to prove this very process. What Leavis repeatedly attacks as 
Snow’s clichéd writing – a kind of conformist linguistic passivity observed also in « the 
Sunday papers » or « British Council » publications – mirrors and encourages an identi-
cally unthinking acceptance in its readers (Leavis 2013:55,57). Leavis’s dismissive terms 
(« nullity » « negligibility », « nought » « ignorant », e.g. Leavis 2013:56) thus function 
only incidentally as personal affronts; they function primarily to stress Snow’s perfect, 
camouflaged assimilation into a dehumanizing culture.7 Likewise, Leavis’s subtitle, 
« The Significance of C. P. Snow » (my emphasis), plays on several understandings of 
the word: Leavis attacks not so much Snow himself (despite frequent accusations to the 
contrary) but how he signifies (argumentatively, linguistically) and what he signifies 
(culturally); he is a worrying signifier in and of a culture which is losing its humanity. 
By telling people what they want to hear, Snow’s success is its and its readers’ own 
condemnation. 
Developing these warnings about precisely the kind of « scientific revolution » Snow 
urges – where even the advantages, like « reduced hours of work, and the technological 
resources that make your increasing leisure worth having » may lead to boredom, 
emptiness, even alcoholism – « humanity » is retained as a kind of haven, or enclave.8
The advance of science and technology means a human future of change so rapid 
and of such kinds, of tests and challenges so unprecedented, of decisions and possible 
non-decisions so momentous and insidious in their consequences, that mankind – this 
is surely clear – will need to be in full intelligent possession of its full humanity (and 
« possession » here means, not confident ownership of that which belongs to us – our 
property, but a basic living deference towards that to which, opening as it does into 
the unknown and itself unmeasurable, we know we belong). (Leavis, 2013:73)
18
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Leavis’s « full humanity » thus makes a virtue of its own mystery and elusiveness; he 
urges not Snow-like « confident ownership » of humanity, but « deference » to it. This 
« deference » is based on a curious but important epistemological paradox: « humanity » 
« opens out » into the « unknown » and « unmeasureable », but « we » nonetheless 
« know » we belong to it. Humanity is therefore in this example a mysterious mode of 
knowing, less a species-being (pace Marx), than a species-intuition, which despite – or 
even because of – its sub-rational, instinctive nature (« unknown », « unmeasurable »), 
may guide a humane response to historical change. 
This sense of ‘humanity’ as not so much a property or attribute (as might be commonly 
imagined), but as a (not-quite-conscious?) agency, skill, or ability, comes through more 
strongly when Leavis urges:
What we need, and shall continue to need not less, is something with the livingness 
of the deepest vital instinct; as intelligence, a power – rooted, strong in experience, 
and supremely human – of creative response to the new challenges of time; something 
that is alien to either of Snow’s cultures. (Leavis, 2013:73)
And, Leavis suggests, the idea of humanity as an intuitive mode of knowing (which 
is still knowing), a ‘vital instinct’ (which may be sharpened), a ‘power’ (which may 
be strengthened and tested), may be taught in the form of literary language: « the 
living creative response to change in the present » (Leavis, 2013:106). If language 
deconstructs Snow’s pseudo-opposites ‘individual’ and ‘social’ – no one individual 
invents language, of course, but it is nonetheless the only way of expressing one’s 
distinctiveness to oneself and others – then it is through (literary) language that Leavis 
seeks to develop the university: its individual students, its social role.9 For Leavis, 
the ideal university is « more than a collocation of specialist departments[, it is] a 
centre of human consciousness: perception, knowledge, judgment and responsibility » 
(Leavis, 2013:75, my emphasis).10 And this consciousness can emerge in and as the act 
of literary criticism. « [A]ll that makes us human », Leavis claims with astonishing 
boldness, belongs to the « third realm »: his term for the mode of knowledge – such as 
the collective reading of a poem – which has no easily identifiable location or centre, 
which is « neither merely private and personal nor public in the sense that it can be 
brought into the laboratory or pointed to » (Leavis, 2013:74). The generation of real 
ideas in literary discussion that no one discusser would have reached independently 
highlights the flaws of Snow’s facile dichotomy between social and individual; « the 
re-creative response of individual minds to the black marks on the page » likewise 
tests and elicits for Leavis humanizing critical judgement: a « collaborative-creative 
process […] of individuals who collaboratively renew and perpetuate what they parti-
cipate in – a cultural community or consciousness » (Leavis, 2013:74). The relationship 
between consciousness and (literary) language – the way words live and make live – thus 
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informs, perhaps even defines, Leavis’s understanding of the « human » in a time of 
bewildering technological advance: literary art is « great » in so far as it humanizes its 
readers by articulating and encouraging the individual and collective exercise of critical 
judgement. 
Leavis’s verbal humanism in a post-human world
The sheer intensity of Leavis’s attack stems not then, ultimately, from a defence of 
« literature » as such but from the necessarily « human » effects that only literature 
can afford. Snow’s dichotomy of liberal intellectualism and instrumentalised « social » 
progress quite simply ignores that specifically human fulfillment which comes from 
working with the language which binds us all and of which literature is the supreme 
exemplar. Whether Leavis was fully conscious of this or not, it is precisely his anger at 
Snow which accentuates, if not gives rise to, a surprising understanding of the « human »: 
the « human » exists in a dynamically verbal, rather than statically substantive, ontolo-
gical mode. The human emerges as the act of reading the « poem », a necessarily 
dynamic and time-bound activity « in the minds », rather than the static, materially 
existent « black marks on the page ». For Leavis, « human » seems surprisingly to 
function as a verb (« to human »?): a real-time working with language. 
Such an implicitly « verbal » understanding of the human seems surprisingly to 
resist the various assaults on the term levied in and by Paul Ricœur’s « hermeneutics 
of suspicion », Max Weber’s « disenchanted » modernity, or Jean-François Lyotard’s 
postmodern incredulity towards « meta-narratives », all of which envisage language 
as opposite to, not constitutive of, the « human ». Lacanian psychoanalysts hold 
our « human » sense of ourselves is a mere fantasy sent by a mocking unconscious 
« structured like a language »; Michel Foucault claims « man » is simply a discursive 
term which has served its historical purpose and is destined to be erased (Foucault, 
1966:398); Althusserian Marxists dismiss « human » consciousness as the internalized, 
« interpellated » manifestation of capitalist persuasion; Derridean deconstructionists 
say the truth of ‘human’ existence is internally differentiated and endlessly deferred 
(« différance »). To these specifically poststructuralist challenges, Stefan Herbrechter 
notes, might be added those raised by precisely the « advance of science and 
technology » that Leavis warned would necessitate « full and intelligent possession 
of our humanity »: geneticists hold we are determined by our DNA; our identities are 
diffused online; progressive reliance on technology has led, via the trope of the cyborg, 
to the increasing prevalence and plausibility of ideas raised by the transhumanist 
movement (Herbrechter, 2013:passim).11 
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These serious issues lend perhaps extra relevance to Leavis’s challenging insistence 
on the real, if fragile or temporary, presence of the « human », especially when in 
literary studies the concept has been attacked as a byword for conservative, transhis-
torical generalization. Catherine Belsey’s and Jonathan Dollimore’s 1980s critiques of 
(respectively) « liberal humanism » and « essentialist humanism » are still instructive, 
Herbrechter argues, for more recent « post-human » thinking. « Liberal humanism », 
Belsey argues, is made up of two, related fallacies. First, the fantasy that the individual 
is free (« liberal ») and autonomous fallaciously dismisses powerful constitutive forces 
like language or the unconscious. Second, such « human » « autonomy » is held to be 
truthful eternally (« human nature ») when it in fact corresponds only with a particular 
historical moment, i.e. that dominated by the « free » market of high-capitalist (neo)
liberalism.12 Likewise, what Dollimore attacks as « essentialist humanism » presupposes 
the illusory « idea of the autonomous, unified self-generating subject » (Dollimore, 
2003:155). Such a pre-judgement of the human risks however under-valuing the kinds of 
active, judicious critical power Leavis passionately attributes to the reading human in 
the literary « third space ». Leavis’s attack on Snow moreover parallels – even though 
the value of the « human » is reversed – Dollimore’s more recent attack on « aesthetic 
humanism », where the arts are slotted into a particular (and tamely innocuous) place, 
role and function in and by a more powerful socio-cultural structure. « Aesthetic 
humanism » – the tacit, unspoken preconception that the arts and humanities exist 
exclusively to make humans « better’ » or more « humane » – is for Dollimore one of 
the « obsolete, complacent and self-serving clichés of the culture industry » (Dollimore 
2004:xxii). For Leavis, however, the « human » is precisely the only thing that stops the 
likes of Snow reducing aesthetic response to such cliché.13 
It may seem surprising at this point to undertake an analysis of a four-hundred-year 
old text – Montaigne’s De l’Institution des enfans – but I do so for the following reasons. 
As noted above, Leavis is often compelled in his deferential discussions of the « human » 
to employ vague terms (« unmeasureable » « unknown »), leaving his argument open to 
risks of emptiness; Montaigne’s comparable portrayal, however, illustrates more fully (if 
often implicitly) just how the « human » might be envisaged not as a mere reactionary 
stereotype but as a dynamic linguistic engagement, especially in a pre-Snow historical 
period where the arts and the sciences were not so rigidly or dichotomously opposed. 
The analysis is also intended to contribute to the overlapping debates as to whether 
Montaigne anticipates contemporary thinking on subjectivity, and whether he may be 
recruited as a « post-modern » sceptic avant la lettre (Lyotard claims for example « il 
me semble que l’essai (Montaigne) est postmoderne » Lyotard, 1982:367): Montaigne’s 
appeal to and performative portrayal of the human as a particular response to language 
seems to nuance, even rebut, Lyotard’s claim. 
21
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« Au service de nostre vie »: living language in De l’Institution des enfans
« Montaigne. That such a man wrote has truly augmented the joy of living on this 
earth. » (Nietzsche, 1997: 135)
In a famous manuscript addition to De l’Institution des enfans, Montaigne offers his 
reader a kind of summary of his own reading strategies: 
Je n’ay dressé commerce avec aucun livre solide, sinon Plutarque et Seneque, où 
je puyse comme les Danaïdes, remplissant et versant sans cesse. J’en attache quelque 
chose à ce papier ; à moy, si peu que rien. (Montaigne, 2004: 146C)14
It is implied that Montaigne’s modesty – he learns frustratingly little from Plutarch 
and Seneca, « attaching » their teachings only to the paper before him, not himself – 
propels ‘sans cesse’ his continuous activities of reading and writing: if Montaigne ever 
felt he had learnt enough from his reading such activity would stop. The incessantly 
cyclical patterning afforded by the watery imagery seems to map onto the chapter’s 
overarching structure. The essay finds itself turning, if not in circles, then in spirals: 
multiple returns to the same topic – ideal education – do not lead Montaigne back to 
the same conclusions. In a discernible first « movement » Montaigne considers the 
possibility of language to train the young student as a passive recipient; in its second, 
he urges the importance of the student himself taking the initiative; that he himself 
can use language actively. Here the broad figurative and structural continuums – filling 
and pouring, reading and writing, assimilation and use – seem broadly constituent of and 
necessitated by an overarching link of language with life: perhaps the essay’s central 
concern. This analysis traces a variety of strategies Montaigne employs to cement this 
connection in the reader’s mind: his markedly frequent use of alimentary imagery to 
describe the « intake » of language – the topos of « innutrition » – sets up a loose 
contextual structure which informs his explicit discussions (and uses) of classical 
citation, as well as the way he blurs differences between words and actions, seeing both 
as commonly communicative in a gentlemanly community’s shared ‘grammar’ of values. 
Montaigne’s link of language with life helps explain why he deploys so liberally 
alimentary tropes to describe linguistic/epistemological intake: the language through 
which education is relayed ideally forms an actual part of the living student. Such an ideal 
is implied as Montaigne regrets he « n’a gousté des sciences que la crouste premiere » 
(Montaigne, 2004:146A); describes his love of books in terms of « goust », (sometimes 
replaced by « appétit »), ‘gouster’, or ‘gourmander’ (e.g. Montaigne, 2004: 150A, 
VS155A, VS175A); deems pre-edited, abridged paraphrases as « moëlle et […] substance 
toute maschée » (Montaigne, 2004:160A); and refers repeatedly to texts as « viande » 
(Montaigne, 2004:151A, 170A). This alimentary imagery enables Montaigne to articulate 
educational precepts: it is important, say, for the student to « allécher l’appétit » 
22
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(Montaigne, 2004:177A), or for the tutor to « ensucrer les viandes salubres à l’enfant 
et enfieler celles qui luy sont nuisibles » (Montaigne, 2004:166A). Such imagery also 
helps Montaigne specify the positive effects of reading not only on the reader’s unders-
tanding, as might be assumed (« abreuver l’entendement », Montaigne, 2004:159A), 
but also on the soul (« l’ame trouve où mordre où se paistre », Montaigne, 2004:160A), 
and even on the material body: stories of « magnanimité et force de courage » can 
have an effectively psychosomatic effect on the « muscles », « espessure de la peau et 
durté des os » (Montaigne, 2004:153C); he urges that young students « emboiv[ent] [les] 
humeurs [des Anciens] », Montaigne, 2004:151A). Montaigne thus by moments likens 
verbal with humoral transmission. These links of language with food or the material 
body apply even when couched in negative terms. Montaigne dismisses poor writing for 
example as « décharnée » (Montaigne, 2004:160A), a « fleshless » language illustrated 
later by Heracleon le Megarien’s parody of « Demetrius le Grammairien » and linguistic 
over-codification. Heracleon mocks those who argue if « ballo » has or not a double l, 
or « cherchent la derivation des comparatives cheiron et beltion, et des superlatives 
cheiriston et beltiston » (Montaigne, 2004:160A). Montaigne’s use of alimentary imagery 
to describe the lively and life-giving reading he counsels thus accompanies classical 
examples – Heracleon and Demetrius’s story is from Plutarch – which demonstrate such 
reading in their relevant and resourceful deployment.
Montaigne’s notions of learning as a form of nutrition are informed by his explicit 
discussions of allusion and citation and figured by the way he himself cites prior texts, 
especially as he comes to rewrite and augment the chapter. From the chapter’s earliest 
version Montaigne famously uses from Seneca 26th epistle the image of a bee (the 
« apiary » topos) to describe ideal reading as nourishingly empowering:
Les abeilles pillotent deçà delà les fleurs, mais elles en font apres le miel, qui est 
tout leur ; ce n’est plus thin ny marjolaine: Ainsi les pieces empruntées d’autruy, 
il les transformera et confondera, pour en faire un ouvrage tout sien: à sçavoir son 
jugement. (Montaigne, 2004:152A)
The apiary topos develops the use of alimentary imagery while making thinkable like 
Leavis’s « third space » a vital resonance between mind and language: the ideal, nutri-
tious « absorption » of a text is inseparable from the reader’s intelligently independent 
use of that text.15 Montaigne hints at just such an active synergy as he says: « J’ay leu 
en Tite-Live cent choses que tel n’y a pas leu. Plutarque en y a leu cent, outre ce que 
j’y ay sceu lire, et, à l’adventure, outre ce que l’autheur y avoit mis » (Montaigne, 
2004:156C). As a cognitive process, reading elicits actual qualities beyond the text 
itself. The chapter’s most conspicuous quotations from classical sources often express 
such lively thought, especially Horace’s « sapere aude! » (« dare to be wise! » Epistles, 
1.2). This passage, which remains in the chapter from the A-Text onwards, occupies a 
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broadly central position in its first version, standing out as the longest of seven A-text 
citations, (all from Horace, save a line from Dante’s Inferno) and the only A-text citation 
which benefits from detailed and extensive recontextualisation. In later versions a 
lengthy manuscript addition « announces » the citation much more fully, reflecting 
on themes of self-management, the influence of Socrates, and multiple senses of the 
word « liberal »: « Entre les arts liberaux, commençons par l’art qui nous faict libres » 
(Montaigne, 2004:159C). Horace’s statement about thought and freedom thus seems 
to have played on Montaigne’s mind throughout the chapter’s meditation and compo-
sition. Comparable themes – youth, malleability, movement, free expression – mark 
also the ten additional citations he busily sprinkles through the 1588 B-text of the 
chapter (as through his whole book), such as Horace’s « vitamque sub dio et trepidas 
agat / In rebus »: « let him live in open air, and ever in movement about something » 
(Montaigne, 2004:153B). Such a context informs Montaigne’s inventive neologisms (e.g. 
« ergotisme » for a clichéd turn of logic, Montaigne, 2004:160A), frequent revisions, 
and handwritten marks, not recorded often in the accepted scholarly editions but now 
accessible via the University of Chicago online scans of the « Exemplaire de Bordeaux »: 
Montaigne’s annotated copy of his Essais. Examples of such revisions include him 
crossing out « son jugement » and replacing it with « sa vie », when he discusses the 
main profits of education (Chicago image 0055v), or an effusively long C-Text addition, 
outlining the « vertue » such an education might afford, which breathlessly leaves 
out any commas between the listed values. (Chicago image 0060). As Terence Cave 
famously argues in his still-powerful 1979 study The Cornucopian Text, then, Montaigne 
probes the difference between « loquicitas » (empty, verbose profusion where nothing 
is expressed) and « copia » (where matter, conversely, finds full expression). And to 
address the question satisfactorily is to accept a paradox which confounds the conven-
tional dichotomy between language’s passive absorption and active use: to do the one 
properly is to do the other competently. This comes through not only on the surface 
of the crystallized text – as in formulations like « sçavoir par coeur n’est pas sçavoir » 
(Montaigne, 2004:152C) – but also in the restlessly busy amendments, additions and 
re-marks surrounding Montaigne’s engagements with classical material. 
The question of linguistic ownership is therefore discussed explicitly on the level of 
individual formulations but also « essayed », with characteristic perseverance and to 
provocative effect. Intertwining with and superimposed over Montaigne’s discussions 
(and exemplary deployments) of active reading is a parallel, if loosely and sporadically 
constructed, argument, positing education broadly as an analogy: the right response 
to language is instructively akin to right conduct. Acts are communicative – intelligible 
as « right » or « wrong » – because they take place within a grammar-like consensual 
structure of meaning. This structure is, admittedly, elastic. Indeed, Montaigne mocks 
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with pointed reference to Aristotelian and scholastic terminology those who break 
« ce grand monde » down overly rigidly into « especes soubs un genre » (Montaigne, 
2004:157A); right conduct, like the bee’s transformation of pollen into honey, contri-
butes actively, even creatively, to the rules which frame it. Poetry’s formalization of 
language is for Montaigne a key example. His regretful tone at Plato’s dismissal of the 
study of « les sciences lettrées, il […] semble ne recommander particulièrement la 
poesie que pour la musique » (Montaigne, 2004:166C) is consistent with his praise of 
poetry elsewhere in the chapter and, albeit more ambiguously, elsewhere in the Essais. 
But poetry is emphatically not an entirely free mode of utterance; it must by contrast 
interact, even antagonistically, with its formal constraints. 
[T]out ainsi que la voix, contrainte dans l’étroit canal d’une trompette, sort plus 
aigue et plus forte, ainsi me semble il que la sentence, pressée aux pieds nombreux 
de la poesie, s’eslance bien plus brusquement et me fiert d’une plus vive secousse. 
(Montaigne, 2004:146A)
Poetry aligns words into « pieds nombreux » : their rhetorical and syntactical patterns 
intersect in various, even antagonistic ways with the rules of versification. These osten-
sible « limits » only make the « life » of language come through all the clearer. Likewise, 
living well, in the shadow of mortality, is envisageable for Montaigne as « poetic » in so 
far as it depends on an engagement with rules of « meurs » and « sens »: 
Car il me semble que les premiers discours dequoy on luy doit abreuver l’enten-
dement, ce doivent estre ceux qui reglent ses meurs et son sens, qui luy apprendront à 
se connoistre, et à sçavoir bien mourir et bien vivre. (Montaigne, 2004:160A)
Montaigne’s use of variously alimentary imagery, demonstration of successful reading 
in (and as) his allusively citational writing, and varying uses of analogy, thus strive 
cumulatively to make an « art de vivre » thinkable as a kind of corporeal extension of 
reading well. Unlike Snow and Leavis, then, Montaigne is thus able to use « science » 
and (liberal) « arts » more or less interchangeably (Montaigne, 2004:160C): both 
activities exert energy judiciously according to, and via, variously elastic constraints; 
and this exercise of judgement becomes easier with training precisely because it stren-
gthens and nourishes such judgement. This contextualizes and helps explain why, say, 
Montaigne mirrors the (markedly similar) terms « philologous » (« curieux d’apprendre 
les choses ») and « logophilous » (« qui n’avoyent soing que du langage ») as if they 
were positive and negative inversions of the same, continuous activity (Montaigne, 
2004:173A). It also explains his express likening of books with real-world situations: 
« Or, à cet apprentissage, tout ce qui se presente à nos yeux sert de livre suffisant: la 
malice d’un page, la sottise d’un valet, un propos de table, ce sont autant de nouvelles 
matieres’ (Montaigne, 2004:152A, my emphasis).
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It is perhaps instructive then that one of Montaigne’s most strident appeals to such 
a kind of « art de vivre » takes the form not of an argument or aphorism but, as 
in Plutarch’s Lives (praised elsewhere, Montaigne, 2004:156A) an embodied, personal 
example known to Montaigne through his reading: Socrates. Perhaps more than coinci-
dentally, this passage, which praises Socrates in the context of travel, and how it 
improves one’s judgement, also contains a clustered trio of emphatic uses of the word 
‘humain’, a word which occurs only three times elsewhere in the whole of the rest of 
the chapter. 
Il se tire une merveilleuse clarté, pour le jugement humain, de la frequentation du 
monde. Nous sommes tous contraints et amoncellez en nous, et avons la veue racourcie 
à la longueur de nostre nez. On demandoit à Socrates d’où il estoit. Il ne respondit 
pas: D’Athenes; mais: Du monde. Luy, qui avoit son imagination plus plaine et plus 
estandue, embrassoit l’univers comme sa ville, jettoit ses connoissances, sa société et 
ses affections à tout le genre humain, non pas comme nous qui ne regardons que sous 
nous. Quand les vignes gelent en mon village, mon prebstre en argumente l’ire de Dieu 
sur la race humaine, et juge que la pepie en tienne des-jà les Cannibales. A voir nos 
guerres civiles, qui ne crie que cette machine se bouleverse et que le jour du jugement 
nous [tient] prent au collet, sans s’aviser que plusieurs pires choses se sont veues, et 
que les dix mille parts du monde ne laissent pas de galler le bon temps cependant? 
(Montaigne, 2004:157A)
The « monde », famously invoked by Socrates in the context of his citizenry, seems 
to function here in two interrelated senses: first, the sum total of the human population 
and its habitats; secondly, the location where thoughts or acts are ultimately evaluated 
as right and wrong. Montaigne’s mockery of his locals’ conviction that frozen vines 
or (admittedly more seriously) the French religious wars are signs of apocalypse is, 
after all, based on the wider perspective he is able to adopt. Travel is therefore an 
intellectual displacement as well as a purely physical one; the markedly cognitive 
terms with which Montaigne describes it (« frotter et limer son cervelle contre celle 
d’autruy », Montaigne, 2004:153A, my emphasis) invites the idea that it exposes the 
traveler-student to many more grammar-like social structures in and with which he 
may judge his conduct as correct. The traveller’s knowledge of the Socratic « monde », 
then, sees geographical displacement in terms surprisingly reminiscent of Leavis’s 
notion of the « human »: an exercise of literary or linguistic judgement which figures 
right conduct in terms of a universal collective.
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Conclusion
This essay has argued that underlying F. R. Leavis’s response to C. P. Snow’s famous 
and widely-read lecture on the « Two Cultures » is less a straightforward defence of 
the arts than an attack on how Snow opposes them straightforwardly with the sciences. 
In this, Leavis parallels Jonathan Dollimore’s later attack on wider cultural attempts 
to localize, restrict and pigeonhole the arts in terms of a singular function or role. But 
while Dollimore sees such attempts as based on a lazily universalizing stereotype of the 
« human » – the idea art makes you more « humane » is thus inherently reactionary – 
Leavis sees reading’s « humanising » effects as precisely the only thing that can resist 
Snow’s reductively instrumentalising divisions of specifically « artistic » or « scientific » 
intellectual endeavour. It was noted, however, that Leavis, when called upon to define 
and articulate just what he means by the « human », often concedes a certain termino-
logical or argumentative fuzziness at the price of a modest « deference »: we « know 
we belong » to « the human », but any further elaboration on this idea, and precisely 
how it corresponds to the reading of literature, is often obscure. It was suggested 
that insights from Montaigne could be useful here, not least because he wrote in and 
to a culture where intellectual endeavour was arranged and aligned in ways radically 
different from ours. The discussion of Montaigne’s De l’Institution des enfans traced 
his use of alimentary imagery to see language as a form of nourishment, surveyed his 
busy, restless additions and revisions, examined his explicit discussions (and implicit 
demonstrations) of his own modes of reading, and saw his praise of Socrates as emble-
matic of « la race humaine » as a culmination of a sustained figurative chain whereby 
text and world were seen as analogies of each other: as poetry relies for its meaning 
on the ways its syntactic, rhetorical or semantic qualities and structures correspond 
(or not) with versificatory conventions, so conduct relies for its meaning on how it 
corresponds (or not) with socio-cultural frameworks, of which the understanding may 
be enriched by travel. Socrates’ citizenry of the « monde » (rather than just Athens), is 
thus supremely « humain » because of the encompassing way it is willing to negotiate 
cognitively, judiciously, within these overlapping, grammar-like social structures. So, 
while Montaigne does not make impossible claims about language’s ability to adopt 
super-linguistic modes of existence, his metaphorical, rhythmical, and figurative 
techniques do work, collectively, to stress how language, and the reality of which that 
language’s living, human reader is a part, are surprisingly close structural analogues. 
Even the chapter’s overall argumentive arc, which moves like his « apiary » image from 
questions of passive language absorption to questions of active language use, likewise 
elicits in its myriad and often confusing digressions precisely the kind of readerly 
engagement his chapter strives strenuously and everywhere to advocate. Montaigne’s 
neologisms, redrafts, and analogies thus all emerge as elements of a search to open out 
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the individual and collective (co-)operations of words, to struggle within and against his 
language’s semantic, syntactical, metaphorical, cultural, and imitative resources, to 
put his finger on an intimately intuited truth: a willingness to make words live. In this, 
Montaigne reveals tantalizing horizons for studying and thinking about literary language 
in the ‘post-human’ twenty-first century.
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Notes
1. See Stephen Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity (Toulmin 1990)
2. Montaigne, of course, is a humanist in the Renaissance sense: following the trivium and 
quadrivium he makes instructive use of texts from antiquity in order to solve contemporary 
political and intellectual problems. De l’Institution des enfans – Montaigne’s most express analysis 
of humanist education, as the title suggests (although these themes are a common preoccupation 
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of the whole book) – is for example indebted to Plutarch’s On the education of children. See 
for discussions of Renaissance humanism the essays assembled in the Cambridge Companion to 
Renaissance Humanism (ed. Kraye 1996), and, more specifically on Montaigne’s Renaissance 
humanism, Bernard Jolibert, Montaigne: L’Éducation humaniste (Jolibert 2009), and Hubert 
Vincent, Éducation et scepticisme chez Montaigne (Vincent 2000).
3. John Brockman edited a collection of essays published in 1995 – « The Third Culture » – a 
term taken up by Slavoj Žižek and others; and the fiftieth anniversary of the « Snow-Leavis » 
controversy was commemorated in the years 2009-12 by a small but impassioned set of publica-
tions. Chief among these is Guy Ortolano’s exhaustive history of the debate The Two Cultures 
Controversy: Science, Literature and Cultural Politics in Post-war Britain (Ortolano 2009). The 
collection of essays From Two Cultures to No Culture, commissioned by the centre-right think-tank 
Civitas (Furedi et al 2010), saw in the discussion a gloomy prognosis of the « dumbing down » it 
attributed more or less exclusively to Tony Blair’s New Labour education policy, especially Blair’s 
ambition of getting more young people into university. The exchange’s enduring topicality was has 
also been demonstrated by excellent re-editions of Snow’s and Leavis’s lectures – including their 
follow-up statements over the debate – by Stefan Collini, himself a thoughtful and outspoken critic 
of successive governments’ education policies (Collini 1998, Collini 2013). 
4. The way Snow builds his arguments lead him to some poorly justified and plainly inaccurate 
predictions: he sees the « disparity between rich and poor » disappearing by 2000 because « It’s just 
not on » (Snow, 1998:42). Roger Kimball rightly complains of « gulfs, gaps, chasms, caesurae » in 
Snow’s logic (Furedi et al 2010:35). For example, and despite the odd mention of a possible « third 
culture », Snow entirely ignores (say) philosophy as a genuine bridge between « the two cultures ». 
Snow’s terminology is « slippery », even a « terrible muddle » (Furedi et al 2010:35). His lecture’s 
often conversational tone often makes it seem more like a set of anecdotes than a coherent case; 
the tendency to generalize from scant or anecdotal evidence is clear. Snow says for example 
literary intellectuals are « Luddites » and scientists have « the future in their bones » (Snow, 
1998:10). But he demonstrates his claims less through detailed statistical reference – though Snow 
does mention a survey of « thirty to forty thousand scientists » (Snow, 1998:11) – than personal 
experiences. He meets « W. L. Bragg in the buffet on Kettering station on a very cold morning in 
1939 » (Snow, 1998:1); G. H. Hardy remarks to him « in mild puzzlement » that the term « intel-
lectual » never seems to pertain to scientists (Snow, 1998:4); yet more troublingly, a nameless 
« scientist of distinction » suggests to him that ninety percent of writers brought « Auschwitz that 
much nearer » (Snow, 1998:7): a suggestion Snow later refutes, but only reservedly. 
5. A proviso might be noted here: Snow indeed temporarily entertains the idea of a « third 
culture », but ultimately rejects it (Snow, 1998:9); he regrets this, however, and anticipates the 
arrival of such a culture in his 1963 The Two Cultures: A Second Look (see Snow, 1998:70 et seq). 
6. « Industrialisation is the only hope of the poor », Snow proclaims; to reject it is to « go without 
much food, see most of your children die in infancy, despise the comforts of literacy, accept 
twenty years off your own life » (Snow, 1998:25). Regardless of the fact that globalised capitalist 
industrialization in 2014 has only led to deepening inequality, Snow’s radical polarity between 
literary intellectualism (he condescendingly dismisses their imagined « aesthetic revulsion » via 
metonymic reference to Walden by Henry David Thoreau, Snow, 1998:25) and mass starvation, as 
if you cannot have one without the other, is for Leavis disastrous.
7. The sheer aggressiveness of some of Leavis’s comments elsewhere lends weight to the oft-made 
criticism that his lecture was quite simply an ad hominem attack: see the essay by Raymond Tallis 
in the Civitas volume. But this vigorous urgency is often inseparable from an anxious, repeated 
stress on the « human ». Consider as an example the following passage: « Of history, of the 
nature of civilization and of the history of its recent developments, of the human history of the 
Industrial Revolution, of the human significances entailed in that revolution, of literature, of the 
nature of that kind of collaborative human creativity of which literature is the type, it is hardly 
an exaggeration to say that Snow exposes complacently a complete ignorance » (Leavis, 2013:54) 
8. At one point, for example, Leavis regretfully cites the example a French study, which observes 
that leisure time is as strenuously organized as work time (Leavis, 2013:72).
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9. At one point Leavis states: « I mentioned language because it is in terms of literature that I 
can most easily make my meaning plain, and because of the answer that seems to me called for 
by Snow’s designs on the university » (Leavis, 2013:74).
10. Leavis recalls he only chose to retort to Snow in the first place as he realized, while marking 
Cambridge scholarship exams that « sixth-form masters were making their bright boys read Snow 
as doctrinal, definitive and formative – and a good examination investment » (Leavis, 2013:56). 
The word « investment » is to my mind loaded: it recalls the calculatedness inherent in Snow’s 
notion of knowledge, as well as the dry predictability and self-interest in that of his idea of 
collective advance.
11. See for a representative example of transhumanist texts and positions (eds) More and Vita-More, 
The Transhumanist Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science, Technology, and 
Philosophy of the Human Future (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).
12. I extrapolate these connotations from Belsey’s own definition, liberal humanism « proposes 
that the subject is the free, unconstrained author of meaning and action, the origin, of history. 
[He or she is] unified, knowing and autonomous » (Belsey 1985:8). 
13. Note in this regard how Leavis expressly attacks Snow’s style as a novelist as an « advancing 
swell of cliché » (Leavis, 2013:64).
14. Page numbers following citations from Montaigne refer to the Villey-Saulnier edition of the 
Essais and specify for information the successive versions of the text composed in and after 
Montaigne’s lifetime: the 1580 edition (« A »), 1588 edition (« B ») and the hand-written amend-
ments of the « Exemplaire de Bordeaux », later published posthumously in 1592 (« C »).
15. See for a more sustained discussion of Montaigne’s citational strategies see Christine Brousseau-
Beuermann, La Copie de Montaigne: Étude sur les citations dans les Essais (Brousseau-Beuermann 
1989).
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